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The antitrustanalysis of mergers should be reconsidered.

Four Lessons
from the
Whole Foods Case
By THOMAs A. LAMBERT
University ofMissouri- Columbia School of Law
ne of the most maligned antitrust decisions in history involved a merger of
grocery store chains. Indeed, even those
voices inclined toward substantial
antitrust intervention believe the U.S.
Supreme Court erred in its 1966 Von's
Grocery decision, which condemned the
merger of the third- and sixth-largest grocery store chains in
Los Angeles. For example, the president of the reliably interventionist American Antitrust Institute conceded that the
Supreme Court "probably went too far" and acknowledged
that "if Von's Grocery had remained the rule, all of our industries would be highly fragmented and consumers would have
lost out on many cost-cutting efficiencies." The fact is, grocery
retailing involves huge scale economies and low barriers to

entry - a combination that renders most consolidations beneficial to consumers.
Despite the apparent consensus on Von's Grocery, federal
antitrust regulators seem determined to repeat its mistakes.
Last summer, the Federal Trade Commission shocked the business community by seeking to block the merger of two highend grocery chains, Whole Foods Markets and Wild Oats Markets. Fortunately for consumers, cooler heads prevailed - the
federal court hearing the FTC's merger challenge rejected the
agency's motion for preliminary injunction. But while things
turned out all right this time, the incident reveals a number of
deficiencies in the merger review process. This article describes
the Whole Foods debacle and catalogues four lessons regulators and courts should draw from the incident.
Thomas A. Lambert is associate dean for faculty research and development and
associate professor in the School of Law at the University of Missouri-Columbia.
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THE FTC'S CHALLENGE
In February 2007, Whole Foods and Wild Oats entered an
agreement under which Whole Foods would acquire Wild Oats
for approximately $670 million. Four months later, after collecting 20 million documents from the two companies (but
almost no pricing data), the FTC sued to block the merger. The
agency claimed the merger would constitute an anticompetitive
combination of the top two competitors in the highly concentrated market for "premium natural and organic supermarkets."
According to the FTC's complaint, such supermarkets constitute a separate market from conventional supermarkets
because they "offer a distinct set of products and services to a
distinct group of customers in a distinctive way." With respect
to their product offerings, premium natural and organic supermarkets are distinct in that they "focus on perishable products,
offering a vast selection ofvery high-quality fresh fruits and vegetables - including exotic and hard-to-find items - and other
perishables." Customers of premium natural and organic supermarkets are also distinct: in the FTC's words, they're "affluent,
well-educated, health-oriented, quality food oriented people."
Finally, the FTC asserted, premium natural and organic supermarkets provide a distinctively higher level of service: more
amenities, a more knowledgeable staff, branding that promotes
a healthy lifestyle and ecological sustainability, and a place for
shoppers to "gather, interact, and learn." Because of those distinguishing characteristics, the FTC maintained, premium natural and organic supermarkets, of which Whole Foods and
Wild Oats are the only national chains, compete in a separate
market from such conventional supermarkets as Safeway and
Kroger. A merger of the two chains would virtually eliminate
competition in that distinct market, thereby harming con-

0

sumers by causing higher prices or reduced levels of service.
Of course, a narrow market definition was crucial to the
FTC's challenge. If the market in which Whole Foods and
Wild Oats participate includes conventional grocers like
Kroger and Safeway (or maybe even the nation's largest grocer, Wal-Mart, which now carries an extensive collection of
organic products), then consolidation of the two firms would
have little competitive effect; there would still be substantial
competition in the market after the consolidation of the two
chains into one. Thus, the FTC's challenge could go nowhere
unless the market were defined to exclude conventional supermarkets and other retailers of food and groceries.
To support its narrow market definition - the lynchpin of
its case - the FTC initially relied almost entirely on Whole
Foods' own characterization of its market in its internal documents. For example, the FTC's complaint pointed to a statement lifted from Whole Foods' announcement of its fourth
quarter 2006 earnings: "Whole Foods Market is about much
more than just selling 'commodity' natural and organic products. We are a lifestyle retailer and have created a unique shopping environment built around satisfying and delighting our
customers." That statement and others like it formed the primary basis for the FTC's allegation that premium natural and
organic supermarkets like Whole Foods and Wild Oats constitute a distinct antitrust market.

Not until it had filed its complaint and
put a temporary hold on the merger did the FTC try to build
an economic case for a distinct market consisting of premium natural and organic supermarkets. To do so, the agency
needed evidence concerning cross-elasticities of demand - i.e.,
the degree to which consumers would switch to other sources
of supply in response to a price increase. Under the FTC's own
horizontal merger guidelines, the contours of a market are
determined entirely on the basis of such elasticities. Specifically, a market is defined by lumping together the narrowest
possible grouping of products or services that could constitute the market (say, a single brand of the product or service)
and asking whether a hypothetical single seller of those goods
or services could profitably impose a "small but significant
non-transitory increase in price" - usually a 1-5 percent
price increase for a one-year period. If the price increase
would not be profitable because it would induce too many
consumers to switch to alternatives, then the collection is
expanded to include the next-best product or service, and the
question is repeated. This process continues until it reveals
a grouping of products or services for which a price increase
would be profitable. That grouping constitutes the relevant
market. In the Whole Foods/Wild Oats case, then, the key
question would be whether a price increase by so-called premium natural and organic supermarkets would drive so many
WRONG QUESTION
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consumers to conventional supermarkets that the price
increase would not be profitable.
In light of this economic approach to defining markets an approach that turns entirely on how customers respond to
price changes - it is astounding that the agency collected no
pricing data from Whole Foods and Wild Oats until after it
had filed its complaint. It chose instead to base its market definition on statements from Whole Foods executives touting
the chain's distinctiveness. It also relied heavily on a troubling
e-mail that Whole Foods CEO John Mackey sent to the board
of directors to drum up support for the Wild Oats merger:
By buying [Wild Oats] we will...avoid nasty price wars in
Portland (both Oregon and Maine), Boulder, Nashville,
and several other cities which will harm [Whole Foods']
gross margins and profitability. By buying [Wild
Oats].. .we eliminate forever the possibility of Kroger,
Super Value, or Safeway using their brand equity to

answers the wrong question: because the plan called for the
merged firm to close Wild Oats stores after the merger, the relevant question would be whether Wild Oats stores (the ones
to be eliminated) had a disciplining effect on Whole Foods'
pricing - not vice-versa. Murphy conceded that the data could
not establish either that exit of a Wild Oats store led to higher prices at a neighboring Whole Foods or that entry of a Wild
Oats store reduced prices at a nearby Whole Foods. Nor could
the data show anything about how the entry or exit of conventional supermarkets affected Whole Foods' pricing. (There
are so many conventional supermarkets that it was impossible
to find a geographic region where either a first conventional
supermarket moved into a Whole Foods neighborhood or a last
conventional supermarket moved out of the neighborhood.)
On the question of whether conventional supermarkets
would respond to price increases at Whole Foods by expanding natural and organic offerings and enhancing services, Murphy could say almost nothing of substance. The fact is, con-

The merger of two relatively small players
would not give the combined firm the power to
raise prices and/or cut back on services.
launch a competing natural organic food chain to rival
us.... [Wild Oats] may not be able to defeat us but they
can still hurt us.... [Wild Oats] is the only existing company that has the brand and number of stores to be a
meaningful springboard for another player to get into
this space. Eliminating them means eliminating this
threat forever, or almost forever.
As it turns out, both Whole Foods' self-promoting market
characterizations (intended to tout its business model) and
Mackey's claims about how the merger would reduce price
competition (intended to persuade board members to support
the merger) were wrong. When the FTC finally got around to
collecting and analyzing pricing data, it could show neither
that premium natural and organic supermarkets constitute a
market separate from conventional supermarkets nor that a
combined Whole Foods/Wild Oats would be able to avoid
price competition. Faced with the real world pricing data, the
most the agency's expert economist, University of Chicago professor Kevin Murphy, could conclude on the market definition
question was that (1) Whole Foods and Wild Oats are close
substitutes for one another, (2) there is significant competition between the two supermarkets, and (3) Whole Foods had
a disciplining effect on Wild Oats' prices.
That was not enough. No one ever doubted the first two
conclusions, which are wholly irrelevant to the question of
whether conventional grocers and other food sellers also compete with Whole Foods and Wild Oats. The third conclusion
24
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ventional grocery store chains like Safeway are moving in the
direction of Whole Foods - Safeway opened 76 premium
"Lifestyle" stores between 2003 and 2007 and has converted
more that 700 existing stores to the Lifestyle format. Murphy's
response to this fact was to quote a statement from Mackey's
first quarter 2007 report to the Whole Foods board: "I don't
believe these [Lifestyle] stores have had much real impact on
us, although they've increased Safeway's comps a couple of
hundred basis points (not that much when you consider the
immense amount of capital invested)." Based on that statement
and another like it, Murphy concluded that "at least to date,
conventional supermarkets have not been successful at competing effectively in the relevant market." But the question is
not what has happened "to date"; rather, it is what would happen if a combined Whole Foods/Wild Oats raised prices. The
fact that Safeway is running headlong in the direction of adopting a Whole Foods-like format suggests that it could easily
swoop into Whole Foods' space in response to a price increase.
Murphy again focused on only the current state of affairs in
attempting to explain why the explosion of organic offerings at
conventional grocery stores - a trend he conceded - would not
constrain pricing at a merged Whole Foods/Wild Oats. He
explained that "if conventional supermarkets offer a lot oforganic items, they do not sell enough with their current customer base,
and many of the products spoil, reducing margins" (emphasis
added). But the key point is that ifthe post-merger Whole Foods
were to raise prices on organic products, the customer base of
conventional grocers would change to include more consumers

seeking organics. If that occurred, expansion oforganic offerings
would become profitable for conventional grocers. The fact that
conventional supermarkets have not increased organic offerings with their current customer bases is irrelevant to whether
they are poised to do so in response to a price increase.
In the end, the arguments by Murphy -a brilliant economist who made the strongest case he could, given
the FTC's untimely acquired pricing data- were stymied by key
facts ofwhich the FTC would have been aware had it examined
pricing data prior to filing its complaint. As the district court
explained, the available sales and pricing data showed:
SUBSTITUTION

(1) Wild Oats prices are higher than Whole Foods
prices where the two companies compete, (2) Whole
Foods prices are essentially the same at all the stores
in its region, regardless of whether there is a Wild
Oats store nearby, and (3) when Whole Foods does
enter a new market where Wild Oats operates, Whole
Foods takes most of its business from other retailers,
not from Wild Oats.
Taken together, those three facts undermine the FTC's
insistence that Wild Oats uniquely constrains Whole Foods so
that a merger of the two companies would injure consumers.
The first fact suggests that Whole Foods' effect on Wild Oats
results from the former's lower pricing, which is likely occasioned by the superior efficiency resulting from Whole Foods'
larger scale (which, of course, would increase with the merger). The second fact indicates that Whole Foods' effect on Wild
Oats' pricing proves nothing about the degree to which Wild
Oats' presence constrains Whole Foods' pricing. Given that the
merger contemplates the closure of Wild Oats stores, not
Whole Foods stores, that is the relevant constraining effect.
The third fact suggests that consumers view Whole Foods as
a competitive alternative to conventional grocery store chains,
from which it usurps business.
Moreover, the FTC's position ignored the fact that most customers of premium natural and organic supermarkets also
shop regularly at conventional grocery stores. Given widespread cross-shopping, it would be nearly impossible for a
combined Whole Foods/Wild Oats to raise prices on any item
that was available at conventional grocery stores; customers
would simply forgo purchasing that item on their Whole
Foods trip and would instead purchase it on their trip to the
conventional grocery store. As conventional grocery stores
have beefed up their offerings of natural and organic products
- a trend the FTC concedes - this cross-shopping has eliminated the opportunity for hiking prices on most individual
items. Thus, to use economic jargon, it would be exceedingly
easy for consumers and conventional grocery stores to respond
to supracompetitive pricing by engaging in, respectively,
demand and supply substitution.
Given the realities of the supermarket industry - realities
ofwhich the FTC would have been aware had it done its homework before filing its complaint - the district court concluded that Whole Foods and Wild Oats are not insulated from sig-

nificant competition from conventional grocery store chains.
Instead, they compete with conventional supermarkets and
conventional supermarkets compete with them. When those
other supermarkets are considered part of the relevant market,
it becomes clear that the merger of two relatively small players
in the much larger overall market would not give the combined
firm the power to raise price and/or cut back on services, to the
detriment of consumers. The district court therefore properly denied the FTC's motion for preliminary injunction.
LESSONS FROM THE FTC'S CHALLENGE

While things worked out correctly this time around, one
might deem the Whole Foods affair a near miss. Had the district court judge deciding the case been less economically
sophisticated and more sensitive to "tough talk" in internal
documents, this case could have come out differently. After all,
the agency did uncover some inflammatory documents and
managed to get one of the nation's foremost economists to testify on its behalf. A less able or more distracted judge might
not have recognized the weakness of the FTC's claims.
It is thus worth asking what general lessons concerning
merger review should be taken from the FTC's failed attempt.
Four come to mind:
LESSON ONE: "Hot documents" defining the market, demonstrating apparent motivation, or predicting effects should be irrelevant.
As noted, the FTC did not collect detailed pricing information
from Whole Foods and Wild Oats until after it had filed its
complaint seeking to enjoin the merger. The initial basis for
the agency's position thus could not have been economic data
showing that Wild Oats provides a unique constraint on
Whole Foods. Instead, the agency chose to rely on internal
Whole Foods documents suggesting that Whole Foods and
Wild Oats compete in a distinct market and that competition
would be reduced by the merger.
For example, in concluding that premium natural and
organic supermarkets constitute a distinct market, the FTC initially did not look at the degree to which consumers would
alter consumption patterns in response to higher prices.
Instead, it relied on such documentary evidence as:
mMackey's statement that Whole Foods has "create[d] a
customer loyalty that will not be stolen away by conventional markets who sell the same products,"
" Whole Foods' assertion in its 2006 Annual Report that
"[w]e believe our heavy emphasis on perishable products differentiates us from conventional supermarkets
and helps us attract a broader customer base,"
" Mackey's claim that "Whole Foods['] core customers
will not abandon them because Safeway has made their
stores a bit nicer and is selling some organic foods,"
mAn earnings announcement proclaiming that "Whole
Foods Market is about much more than just selling
'commodity' natural and organic products. We are a
lifestyle retailer and have created a unique shopping
environment built around satisfying and delighting
our customers," and
REGULATION SPRING 2008
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m Documents in which Mackey claimed that "people
who think organic foods are the key don't understand
[Whole Foods'] business model" and that "organic
food is only part of [Whole Foods'] highly successful
business model."
Besides relying on internal documents to define the relevant
market, the FTC also pointed to such documents as establishing the merger's anticompetitive purpose and effect. Indeed, the
third sentence of the complaint alleges: "Whole Foods' Chief
Executive Officer John Mackey bluntly advised his board of
directors of the purpose of this acquisition" and then proceeds
to quote Mackey's aforementioned e-mail about "avoid[ing]
nasty price wars" and "eliminat[ing] forever the possibility of
Kroger, Super Value, or Safeway using their brand equity to
launch a competing natural organic food chain to rival us."
In the end, though, the FTC's document-based inferences
about market definition and competitive effect were undermined by real-world pricing data. That should not be surprising. Business people routinely make puffing claims about the
uniqueness of the product or service they are selling, and it
would be naive to infer from such self-serving claims that the
products or services at issue really are so unique that the seller
could raise prices above competitive levels without causing buyers to substitute toward alternatives. Whole Foods' claim to be
a "lifestyle retailer" offering "a unique shopping environment"
says next to nothing about whether shoppers would really refrain
from substituting to, say, a Safeway Lifestyle Market in response
to a price increase. Similarly, aggressive "fighting words" in internal communications generally say little about the real purpose
of planned conduct - much less the likely effect of such conduct.
For example, the inflammatory "avoid nasty price wars" language
quoted at the beginning of the FTC's complaint appeared in a
last-minute e-mail that was designed to drum up board support
for the Wild Oats merger. One could not infer the true purpose
of the merger from this out-of-context snippet and, even if one
could, it is effect - not purpose - that really matters. Divining
likely effect requires a hard look at economic data rather than
consideration of statements lifted out of context.
Geoff Manne and Marc Williamson have persuasively criticized the use of "hot docs" in antitrust enforcement. They
observe that accounting documents, market definition documents, and documents containing "fighting words" frequently give rise to economically inaccurate inferences and are
highly prejudicial, but they are nonetheless routinely used in
antitrust enforcement and adjudication. Under modern discovery rules, such documents are readily available to regulators and litigants, causing a "the light's better over here" problem (i.e., the difficulty confronting the drunkard who searches
for his lost keys under the streetlamp, not because that is
where he left them, but because "the light's better over here").
With respect to market definition documents, the Supreme
Court exacerbated this problem by stating in the Brown Shoe
case that submarkets could be defined, in part, according to
such "practical indicia" as "industry or public recognition of
the []market as a separate economic entity, the product's
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities,
26
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distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors." This unfortunate statement invited
litigants and regulators to scour business documents for market characterizations that suit their end. Unfortunately, those
characterizations are frequently inaccurate, and reliance on
business documents rather than econometric evidence often
leads to mistakes. As Manne and Williamson put it:
Business people will often characterize information
from a business perspective, and these characterizations may seem to have economic implications.
However, business actors are subject to numerous
forces that influence the rhetoric they use and the
conclusions they draw. These factors include salesmanship; self-promotion; the need to take credit for
successes and deny responsibility for failures; the need
to develop consensus; and the desire to win support
for an initiative or to neutralize its opponents....
Simply put, the words and procedures used by business people do not necessarily reflect "economic realities," and the effort to integrate them further into
antitrust analysis is misdirected.
LESSON TWO: Unique distribution channels should not be deemed
"markets" unless they significantly reduce transaction costs.
In the Whole Foods case, the FTC never claimed that the relevant market was natural and organic grocery products.
Because such goods are widely available from a multitude of
sellers, defining the market as such would have doomed the
FTC's challenge out of the gate. Instead, the agency asserted
that the relevant market consisted of premium natural and
organic supermarkets.
Defining the market to consist of narrow channels of distribution, notwithstanding the fact that the same merchandise sold through those channels is readily available in parallel distribution markets, is a tack the agency has taken before
- most notably in FTCv. Staples, Inc., in which the agency successfully blocked the merger of retailers Staples and Office
Depot on grounds that it would impair competition in the
market for "the sale of consumable office supplies through
office superstores." In the Whole Foods case, though, the
approach was improper. Antitrust regulators should define
markets to consist of distribution channels only when such
channels significantly economize on transaction costs.
Like the unfortunate reliance on "hot documents" in merger analysis, the characterization ofunique distribution channels
as antitrust markets can be traced to Brown Shoe's discussion of
submarkets. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that "welldefined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes." It then posited the
aforementioned "practical indicia" (industry or public recognition, peculiar characteristics, distinct customers, specialized
vendors, etc.) for determining whether such a submarket exists.
Latching onto this discussion, lower courts and regulators have
largely relied on casual observations and "hunches" to determine
whether distribution channels are unique enough to constitute
distinct markets for antitrust purposes. That is unfortunate, for

economic theory offers a less arbitrary, more structured means
of accurately determining when unique distribution channels
should be deemed antitrust markets.
A proper analysis would begin by asking what is being provided by the participants in a putative market consisting of distribution channels. The answer, of course, is the service of
conveying goods from one link in the distribution chain to
another. (Technically, then, the market in the Whole Foods
case could not have been premium natural and organic supermarkets themselves, which were not for sale to customers,
but premium natural and organic supermarket services.) In the
case of distinctive retailers like premium natural and organic
supermarkets, the primary service is the aggregation of various products and services that are generally available elsewhere. The proper question, then, is whether the sellers of a

at two stores to procure the groceries they desire. Accordingly, if all premium natural and organic supermarkets were to
raise the effective price of their aggregation service by raising
the prices of the products they sell - most of which are available at stores many of their customers already visit - those
cross-shopping customers would just start buying the priceenhanced products at other stores. Doing so would not significantly increase the transaction costs associated with crossshopping customers' grocery shopping. In short, the fact that
premium natural and organic supermarkets do not facilitate
one-stop shopping for many consumers, and thus do not offer
significant transaction cost savings to those consumers, prevents such stores - admittedly a distinctive distribution channel - from being a separate market for antitrust purposes. The
Whole Foods case thus illustrates the need for courts and reg-

Antitrust regulators should define markets to consist
of distribution channels only when such channels
significantly economize on transaction costs.
particular aggregation service could significantly raise the
price of their service (by raising the price of the goods being
aggregated) without losing so many customers that the price
increase would not be profitable.
Customers of a distribution channel seek to minimize the
total cost of obtaining the products purchased from that channel. To do so, they compare the sum of product prices plus transaction costs involved in utilizing competing distribution channels
or combinations of channels. Where the aggregation service
provided by one distribution channel substantially reduces transaction costs for consumers (by, for example, facilitating one-stop
shopping), a single operator ofthat type ofchannel might be able
to raise prices without losing so many customers that the price
increase would not be profitable. In such case, the distribution
channel could constitute a unique market, despite the fact that
the products being distributed are widely available through parallel distribution channels. But if the distribution channel does
not result in significant transaction cost economies and the
products at issue are available through other channels, the channel itselfshould not be deemed a separate market. The key question, then, is whether the use ofa seemingly unique distribution
channel for otherwise widely available products occasions substantial transaction cost savings for consumers.
With respect to premium natural and organic supermarkets,
the answer to that question is almost certainly no. Because premium natural and organic supermarkets do not stock many
popular grocery items (Diet Coke and Cheerios come to mind),
many of their customers also shop regularly at conventional
grocery stores. This suggests that, for many customers, the
transaction cost savings offered by premium natural and organic supermarkets are not that great; the customers must shop

ulators to adhere to an economically informed theory ofwhen
unique distribution channels for otherwise widely available
products may constitute a relevant market.
LESSON THREE: Merger analysis should better account for business trends and productive efficiencies.
In deciding whether to challenge a proposed merger of competitors, the FTC and the Department ofJustice follow guidelines the agencies jointly issued in 1992 and amended in 1997.
Under those guidelines, the reviewing agency begins by defining the market in which the merging competitors participate.
The agency then measures the degree of concentration in
that market and the degree to which the merger would
enhance market concentration. Based on those measurements,
the agency determines the level of scrutiny to be applied.
Mergers are subjected to greater scrutiny if they occur in markets that are already concentrated and occasion larger increases in market concentration.
After defining the market, assessing concentrations, and
determining the level of scrutiny to be applied, the reviewing
agency considers four additional matters to determine whether
the merger will hurt consumers. It examines qualitative factors
about the market at issue to determine whether the merger
could facilitate collusion by the remaining firms in the market
or could permit the merged firm to raise price or reduce quality unilaterally. The agency analyzes whether a price increase or
quality reduction would likely result in timely entry by competitors, so that the merged firm could not harm consumers by
raising price or reducing quality. It asks whether the merger will
occasion such large productive efficiencies (by, for example,
enabling the merged firm to achieve economies of scale) that
REGULATION SPRING 2008
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consumers are likely to be benefited despite an increase in market power. And it considers whether one or both of the merging parties would fail if the merger were not accomplished.
While the merger guidelines represent a tremendous
improvement on standardless "black box" merger review, the
guidelines - at least as implemented - are deficient in at least
two respects. First, they result in an overly static analysis that
fails to account for trends in consumption and production. Market definition is determined primarily on the basis of how consumers would respond to price increases, and that is determined by looking at how consumers have acted in the past. Such
an approach cannot take account of changing trends in consumer behavior. Thus, in examining (and deciding to challenge) the proposed merger of Blockbuster Video and Hollywood Video, the FTC did not adequately account for the fact that
video consumers are moving away from big box rental stores and
toward Internet-based options such as Netflix or direct downloading ofvideo content. A snapshot based on what consumers
have done in the past may present a misleading portrayal of how
they will react to future price increases.
By the same token, trends in supplier conduct are important
but often ignored. In theory, the merger guidelines contemplate that the reviewing agency will take account of supplier
trends, for they call for the agency to include within the relevant
market "uncommitted entrants" that would likely enter the
market in response to a price increase. As the Whole Foods case
shows, though, the agencies often fail to account for the fact that
businesses are already moving into the market space occupied
by the merging companies. Indeed, the June 6, 2007, front page
of the very Wall StreetJournalissue announcing the FTC's opposition to the Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger also reported that
a number ofconventional grocery chains are transforming their
stores to provide a more Whole Foods-like experience:
After years of decline brought on by fighting Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. on price, the nation's grocery chains are on
the mend. The supermarkets are winning back shoppers by sharpening their differences with Wal-Mart's
price-obsessed supercenters, stressing less-hectic stores
with exotic or difficult-to-match products and greater
convenience.... Subdued lighting and high-end selections buttress the nonsupercenter experience. Instead of
the rows of aisles with commonplace brands, the supermarkets are adding tables providing ingredients for
planned meals, luring the kind of customer who shops
for dinner instead of stocking up on groceries once a
week.... Safeway Inc. has converted about half of its
1,755 stores into "Lifestyle" markets with wood floors,
on-site bakeries and high-end private-label brands. The
third largest food retailer after Wal-Mart and Kroger, it
expects to convert all its stores by 2009.
While the merger guidelines recognize that "[m]arket concentration and market share data of necessity are based on historical evidence" and assure that "the [reviewing] Agency will
consider reasonably predictable effects of recent or ongoing
changes in market conditions in interpreting market concentration and market share data," the Whole Foods case shows
28
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that actual practice falls short of this ideal. The agencies
should recommit themselves to a less static analysis.
In addition, the agencies should take greater account of the
productive efficiencies a merger will occasion. While the merger guidelines contemplate consideration of productive efficiencies (albeit fairly late in the analysis), the Whole Foods case
suggests they play a minor role. The FTC never mentioned
productive efficiencies (or the lack thereof) in its complaint and
they played no role whatsoever in its expert's analysis. The
FTC commissioned Murphy to answer six questions, none of
which involved consideration of productive efficiencies the
merger might occasion. That is odd, for grocery retailing is an
industry involving substantial economies of scale, implying
that a larger merged firm will tend to have lower per-unit costs
than the smaller firms of which it is comprised. Indeed, the
800-pound gorilla of grocery retailing is Wal-Mart, whose vast
size enables it to capture scale economies and thereby underprice its rivals. (Wal-Mart's entry into the conventional grocery
market was followed by a slew ofbankruptcies - 26 this decade
- by smaller, regional grocery store chains that could not capture such efficiencies and thus could not compete with WalMart on price.) Without doubt, a merged Whole Foods/Wild
Oats will have lower per-unit costs than either company premerger, and much of the cost-savings will likely be passed on
to consumers. The fact that Whole Foods, the larger of the two
premium natural and organic supermarket chains, charged
lower prices than Wild Oats illustrates how scale in this industry can lower costs and prices. The FTC's public documents,
though, never even acknowledged economies of scale.
LESSON FOUR: The deck should not be stacked so heavily in
favor of the FTC.
Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC to seek a preliminary injunction against a merger that
may violate the antitrust laws. The section then provides that
the court should issue the requested preliminary injunction if
the Commission makes "a proper showing that, weighing the
equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest." This
language has been interpreted to mean that the FTC should get
its preliminary injunction if it shows that it "likely" could prove
that the merger would violate the antitrust laws - in other
words, that it has at least a 50 percent chance of ultimately proving that the merger would violate the antitrust laws.
This lax standard becomes troubling when one considers
what the FTC must prove in order to establish that the merger would in fact violate the antitrust laws. The relevant legal
provision here is Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which forbids
any merger that "may" substantially lessen competition. As the
Brown Shoe Court noted, "Congress used the words 'may be
substantially to lessen competition' (emphasis supplied), to
indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties." Courts interpreting Section 7 have held that a merger violates the law if there is a "reasonable probability" that it would
substantially lessen competition. Thus, any merger posing a
50 percent chance of substantially lessening competition violates the substantive antitrust laws.

Taken together, Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and Section 7
of the Clayton Act set a remarkably low threshold for obtaining a preliminary injunction: The FTC must establish only a So
percent likelihood that there is a 50 percent chance that the
merger would substantially lessen competition. This effectively means that a preliminary injunction may be granted if the
FTC can show facts establishing a 25 percent likelihood that the
challenged merger will substantially reduce competition.
Of course, one might argue that this low proof threshold is
acceptable for a preliminary injunction, which bars the merger only until the court can determine whether the merger would
actually violate Section 7 (i.e., until the FTC actually proves that
the merger would pose at least a 50 percent likelihood of substantially lessening competition). But given the tenuous nature
of merger agreements, the granting ofa preliminary injunction
effectively kills the deal. As David Balto, former policy director
of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, recently observed:
The reality is that no firm has ever continued to litigate a merger against the FTC after losing the preliminary injunction motion. The costs and difficulty of
keeping a merger agreement together are simply too
great. As Justice Fortas observed, in FTC v. Dean Foods,
'Preliminary' here usually means final."
Notably, because of some statutory quirks, mergers challenged by the Justice Department, the other federal agency
charged with evaluating whether proposed mergers violate the
antitrust laws, cannot be effectively thwarted on so slight a
showing. The bipartisan Antitrust Modernization Commission
recently observed that differences between the two agencies'
pre-merger reviews "can undermine the public's confidence
that the antitrust agencies are reviewing mergers efficiently and
fairly." The commission recommended that the FTC consolidate its requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief, a move that would effectively eliminate the overly low
standard for officially "preliminary" - but in effect permanent
- injunctions. The Whole Foods case demonstrates the wisdom
of raising the standard of proof for injunctive relief.
A SILVER LINING?
Although Whole Foods and Wild Oats have already consummated their merger, the FTC has taken the highly unusual step
of appealing the district court's denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. That may actually be a good thing - not
because the district court's substantive analysis was wrong (it
was not), but because an appeal could have a salutary effect
on future merger analyses.
Very few merger challenges are appealed. When regulators
lose, they generally do not appeal because mergers usually close
shortly after the district court rules, and most consummated
mergers are quite difficult to undo. When the parties to a
merger agreement lose, they usually give up because they
know they probably cannot hold the merger agreement together for the duration of an appeal. The result has been a dearth
of Supreme Court merger decisions; the last significant one
was United States v. General Dynamics Corp., decided in 1974.

With the Whole Foods case, the FTC concluded that the combined company's decision to operate Wild Oats stores separately for some period of time would avoid the need to engage
in a messy disentangling of the merged company should the
agency prevail on appeal. Thus, the FTC has appealed.
There is a good chance the current Supreme Court will
agree to hear an appeal if the case proceeds that far. Unlike the
Rehnquist Court it succeeded, the Roberts Court has shown
significant interest in antitrust matters. Indeed, in the last two
terms, the Court decided seven antitrust cases, compared to
an average of less than one per year in the 15 years prior to the
2003-2004 term.
If the Court is presented with an appeal of a merger decision,
it might well take the opportunity to correct some of the unfortunate vestiges ofBrown Shoe. That decision appears to bear at
least some responsibility for two of the errors the FTC committed in the Whole Foods case. Both the unwarranted reliance
on "hot documents" and the improper focus on the unique
appearance of particular distribution channels (rather than
the degree, if any, to which those channels reduce transaction
costs and thereby provide a unique service) might have been supported by Brown Shoe's invitation to determine market boundaries according to non-economic "practical indicia." A Supreme
Court merger decision emphasizing that markets should be
defined entirely on the basis ofeconomic factors would provide
much-needed clarification and would prevent much future
mischief In addition, a Supreme Court merger decision could
emphasize the importance of considering productive efficiencies in determining whether a merger should be challenged.
While the 1997 amendments to the merger guidelines moved
in the right direction by expressly calling for consideration of
such efficiencies, the guidelines do not consider them until
rather late in the analysis and, as the Whole Foods case would
suggest, they are sometimes ignored altogether. The Supreme
Court could remind regulators that such efficiencies should
play a key role in the analysis of proposed mergers. And, while
statutory amendment is likely required to correct the unduly low
standard of proof required for FTC-initiated preliminary injunctions, a Supreme Court decision highlighting the lax standard
(and the discrepancy between the FTC and Department ofJustice standards) could spur Congress to adopt the Antitrust
Modernization Commission's suggestion that the FTC preliminary injunction standards be brought into line with those
applicable to the Department ofJustice.
So there may be a silver lining to the FTC's intervention in
the Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger. Hopefully, the Whole
Foods case will afford the federal court of appeals - or perhaps even the Supreme Court - an opportunity to clean up
merger doctrine so that the lessons of the Whole Foods case
get incorporated into merger doctrine.
1

Readings
w"Hot Docs vs.

Cold Economics:
The Use and Misuse of Business
Documents in Antitrust
Enforcement and Adjudication,"
by Geoffrey A. Manne and E.

Marcellus Willamson. Arizona
Law Review, Vol. 47 (200S).
* "Rationalizing Antitrust
Cluster Markets," by Ian Ayres.
Yale LawJournal,Vol. 95 (1985).
REGULATION SPRING 2008

29

